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1. Introduction  
The aim of this paper is to formulate, illustrate and briefly discuss ethical issues 
actualised by the move of new medical technologies from the context of controlled 
medical research to the routine clinical use on patients. This area of the role of 
medical science and technology in society has not been given much attention in 
research ethics or ordinary medical ethics.(1)  The main reason for this seems to be 
that ethical issues in this area fall somewhere between the traditional ethics of 
medical research and ethical issues actuali sed in the daily practice of clinical 
medicine. Another reason is that, until rather recently, no deep controversies has 
arisen regarding this issue. On the contrary, most medical scientists, physicians and 
political decision makers have been rather content with the way in which the step 
from medical research to clinical medicine is usually taken. 
I will start by briefly describing the context in which this issue arises, and formulate 
two ethical queries: one regarding basic medical ethics and one concerning what 
policies to use in order to handle the basic ethical issue in society. For reasons to be 
explained, I will mainly concentrate on the latter query. After having described the 
standard solution to the policy issue, I will give an example of the introduction of a 
new medical technology in my own country, Sweden, which illustrates several 
serious flaws in the standard solution. From this background, I will then discuss three 
alternative models for how society should deal with the move of medical technologies 
from the area of research to routine health care. Of these, I will argue that what I will 
call the Bureaucratic Model is to be preferred. Finally, I will make some closing 
remarks of what I take to be important ingredients in a plausible answer to the more 
basic ethical issue.  
  
2. Three Received Opinions in Medicine  
The area for ethical inquiry to be examined in this paper is best explained from the 
basis of three views which seem to be more or less received opinions in the medical 
community (in which I include physicians, nurses and other assisting personnel, as 
well as medical scientists and laboratory workers and societal policy makers 
concerned with health care issues). These opinions are the following: 
Beneficence, Safety and Reliability is Required in Routine Health Care  
Medical procedures should not be used in routine health care unless it has been 
established (by scientific testing or long clinical experience) that their benefits (for 
the patients) sufficiently balance their risks in a reliable way. An exception to this 
general rule is cases of extreme and desperate emergency, where the patients life is 
severely endangered unless successfully treated within a short period of time and all 
standard ways of treat ment have already been tried and failed. 
Clinical Medical Research is Acceptable  
New medical procedures which do not (yet) meet the requirement of beneficence, 
safety and reliability may be tested on patients in order to find out whether or not they 
meet this requirement. Such testing must, of course, conform to standard scientific 
methodological requirements. 
Extra Caution is Required in Clinical Medical Research  
Any clinical medical research project must meet the following requirements:  
  
1) The project has been scrutinised and approved of by an ethics com mit 
tee for medical research.  
2) The project has sufficient chances of leading up to the introduction of 
a new medical procedure in routine health care.  
3) Only patients who have significant chances of benefiting from the 
procedure to be tested are admitted into the project.  
4) Patients are admitted into the project only after they have gone 
through procedures which to a sufficient degree guarantee their well-
informed consent to participate.
Of course, also the daily doings in routine health care have their ethical standards to 
conform to. However, apart from the fact that research may apply procedures not fit 
for routine clinical use, these standards are usually not as strict as the ones required in 
clinical medical research. The latter are more restricting on which patients that are 
admitted, and tougher regarding the need for obtaining informed consent. Moreover, 
the ethical monitoring is done beforehand, while, in routine health care, examination 
of ethical liabilities is possible only in retrospect (should someone file a complaint). 
The requirement of extra caution in clinical medical research, of course, is motivated 
by the fact that it is not known with sufficient certainty whether procedures tested in 
such research will in fact do any good for patients.  
  
3. Two Ethical Issues ? One Standard Solution  
So, although both clinical medical research and clinical routine health care have their 
respective ethical standards to conform to, these standards are more cautious in the 
former area. This actualises the question of how the move of new medical procedures 
from the area of medical research to routine health care should be handled. This 
question may be separated into two distinct issues: 
The Basic Ethical Issue  
What determines whether or not a medical procedure meets the requirement of 
beneficence, safety and reliability? Or, formulated in a slightly dif ferent way: What 
determines whether or not extra caution is required in the clinical application of a 
medical procedure? 
The Political Issue  
How should it be decided whether or not a medical procedure meets the requirement 
of beneficence, safety and reliability? Or, formulated in a slightly different way: How 
should it be decided whether or not extra caution is required in the clinical application 
of a medical procedure? 
To be true, any complete answer to the political issue must be informed by some 
answer to the basic ethical issue. This will concern the question of what 
considerations that should be taken into account, and how these should be taken into 
account, when making societal decisions regarding the move of medical procedures 
from research to routine health care. Besides that, however, there is also a question of 
how such societal decision making should be administrated and organised (in contrast 
to the proper content of such decision making, regardless of how it is administrated 
and organised). In the following, I will mainly address this issue of administration 
and organisation, and restrict myself to some brief comment on the more basic ethical 
issue in the closing of this paper. 
Most countries have adopted more or less the same solution to the problem of 
organisation and administration of the kind of decisions under consideration ? 
namely, a system of approval through expert review. This standard solution (as I will 
call it) says that medical procedures are ap pro ved of as appropriate for use in routine 
health care when (and only when) the national experts on the procedure in question 
think so. 
The standard solution has been applied for a long time and seems to work fairly well 
in many cases. Moreover, this solution has the political gain of saving policy makers 
from having to consider the basic ethical issue formulated above. Instead, the move of 
medical procedures from the area of research and into routine health care is handled 
in a purely procedural way where all decisional authority is left to those medical 
specialists that are appointed national experts. Of course, a presupposition of this 
system is that the national experts are expected to make their judgement from a 
purely medical and scientific point of view and according to acceptable standards of 
safety. 
However, the standard solution has several serious drawbacks. I will illustrate these 
by a real case of introducing a new medical procedure from my own country, 
Sweden.  
  
4. The Swedish Introduction of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis  
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) is the latest among methods for prenatal 
diagnosis that facilitates the selection of human offspring on genetic grounds. PGD is 
performed on early embryos that have been produced by in vitro fertilisation (”test-
tube embryos”) before some of these are transferred into a woman’s uterus in order to 
achieve a pregnancy. PGD hence facilitates the preselection on genetic grounds of 
which of several available embryos that shall be given the chance of developing into 
a fetus and, eventually, a child. Unlike conventional prenatal diagnosis, PGD hence 
facilitates the preselection of future children on genetic grounds without any need for 
considering the possibility of an abortion.(2) 
PGD was developed during the second half of the 1980’s, and was first clinically 
applied in 1989-90 by British specialists at the Hammersmith Hospital in London.(3)  
A few years later, Swedish specialists at the Sahlgrenska University Hospital in 
Göteborg were keen on applying PGD on certain patients. 
Parallel to this development, the Swedish authorities had noted the emergence of 
PGD, and passed the question of whether or not to approve of this procedure on to 
various medical ethics bodies, in particular the National Council for Medical Ethics 
("Statens medicinsk-etiska råd" in Swedish). In the period of 1989-92, the various 
medical ethics bodies all gave the same recommendation: PGD should be approved of 
only as a case of clinical medical research. Thus, if the Swedish specialists wanted to 
use PGD on patients they would have to organise a research project that would have 
to meet the requirement of extra caution.(4) 
At the same time, the authorities and the specialists also noted that it was unclear 
whether such use of PGD would actually be legal. According to the Swedish Embryo 
Research Act (adopted in 1991), it is absolutely prohibited to transfer into a woman's 
uterus embryos that have been subjected to "research or experimentation".(5)  
Apparently, if PGD was to be clinically applied in a research setting, this would mean 
that experiments were performed on embryos followed by a transfer of some of these 
embryos into a woman's uterus. 
This tricky situation was resolved in 1992, when the Swedish specialists, after review 
of internationally published data, proclaimed PGD to have been established as 
clinical routine abroad. All they wanted to do was to "import" this routine procedure, 
which they had learnt to master through extensive education and training. Since these 
specialists were at the same time the only available national experts on PGD, this 
meant that, in line with the standard solution, PGD thereby also was appropriate for 
use in routine health care, no matter what was claimed by various medical ethics 
bodies. Thus, PGD could be applied to patients without having to meet the 
requirement of extra caution. Moreover, the ban on transferring into a woman's uterus 
embryos that have been subjected to "research or experiments" was not applicable, 
since the use of routine procedures is not a case of research, nor experimental in any 
other ordinary sense of the word. 
This "real-life" case of the introduction of a new medical procedure illuminate several 
serious flaws of the standard solution. 
First, it points to the risk of biased expert opinions. Regarding many new and 
advanced medical procedures, the risk is obvious that the available national experts 
will be identical to the specialists who want to use the new procedure. This, of course, 
opens for conflicts of interests. 
It is a fact that in 1992, when the Swedish experts declared PGD to have been 
internationally established as a routine procedure, the international expertise in this 
field agreed that PGD is a case of clinical research where extra caution is 
appropriate.  In fact, the international expertise still held this view as late as 1995!(6) 
Of course, as appointed national experts, the Swedish specialists were free to make 
their own judgement from international data regarding PGD. However, it is hard not 
to find it rather odd that this judgement was not at all influenced by a compact 
international consensus that PGD is not a routine procedure. 
This actualises the suspicion that the judgement of the Swedish experts was in fact 
influenced by considerations that may conflict with society's interest in unbiased 
expert assessments. It is, of course, quite possible that they themselves were not 
aware of any such influence. However, it is clear that the Swedish specialists had a 
strong interest in getting permission to use PGD on patients. First and foremost, they 
believed that PGD could be of great benefit to some patients. Secondly, being first in 
Sweden (and in Scandinavia) to clinically apply PGD would involve a certain status 
in the Swedish (and Scandinavian) medical community. Third, being first in this way 
would also mean a head start on other clinics to become the main national centre for 
PGD and other forthcoming procedures in this field. 
A second flaw of the standard solution illuminated by the case of Swedish PGD is 
that it threatens to undermine legislations, such as the Swedish Embryo Research Act, 
thought to safeguard against the legal application of germ-line genetic modifications 
of human beings. The introduction of PGD could be used as a precedential case by 
specialists wanting to implement procedures for germ-line gene therapy. Such 
specialists may proclaim such procedures to have been established as clinical routine 
abroad and claim that if this prevented PGD from falling under the Embryo Research 
Act, the same should hold for other procedures as well. This aspect is relevant also in 
an international perspective, since the legislation thought to rule out legally 
performed germ-line gene therapy in many countries is constructed as a ban on 
certain kind of embryo experimentation or research, not clinical application of 
established routine procedures.(7) 
This leads to the third flaw, which concern society's general interest in controlling the 
introduction of new biotechnological procedures in health care. Obviously, the 
possibility of such control is undermined if decisional authority is handed over to a 
handful of specialists who often have strong personal interests in using new 
procedures.  
  
5. Three Alternative Models  
The flaws of the standard solution leads to the query whether there are any better 
models available for society's regulation of the move of medical procedures from 
research to clinical routine. In this section, I will briefly review three alternative 
proposals, all of which are examples of a "no, unless-approach",(8) i.e. the idea that 
new and risky medical procedures in certain well-specified fields are not allowed for 
use in routine health care, unless a special permission has been issued. 
The Political Model  
According to this proposal, decisions regarding the move of medical procedures from 
research to clinical routine should be explicitly politicised. The simplest variant of 
this model is that such decisions are taken by the national government or parliament. 
The main gain of this model is that society is in control. Also, it reduces the need for 
vague, rigid and in other ways problematic legal bans, such as the Swedish Embryo 
Research Act. At the same time, however, the model has several drawbacks. 
First, the political process is often very slow. To be true, one interest of society is to 
slow down the pace of new medical procedures being introduced for routine use. 
However, it is also important that it is not slowed down too much, since that may 
seriously harm patients who could benefit very much from the use of a new 
procedure. 
Secondly, the political process is also rather unpredictable. If decisions are taken, for 
example, by the parliament, it will be hard for medical specialists, potential patients 
and even for the policy makers themselves to know how a certain proposal regarding 
some medical procedure will be handled and what the outcome may be. This is bad 
for several reasons. One is that no real policy will result and decisions may appear 
arbitrary. Another is that medical specialists and potential patients will get no real 
guidance regarding how to plan their activities and lives. Specialists need to know 
what kind of information is needed in order to have a chance of getting an approval, 
and potential patients need to know whether or not there is any point in expecting a 
possible approval for some new procedure. 
Third, and perhaps most important, the outcome of a political process may to a large 
extent be determined by factors that do not seem relevant for the question of whether 
or not some medical procedure should be approved of for routine use. In politics, 
tactical considerations of various kinds often play an important role for the 
proceedings of some process of decision. Imagine, for example, that the question of 
whether or not to approve of some new medical procedure was to be entangled with 
the question of which political party is most suited to be in power (before an 
upcoming election), or become one of many issues open for "trading" in negotiations 
aimed at the formation of a government (after an election). It is a rather disturbing 
thought that decisions as serious as the ones under consideration should be that 
vulnerable to political tactics and power-play. 
The Quasi-legal Model  
Instead of leaving decisions regarding the move of medical procedures from research 
to clinical routine to the politicians, this proposal instead advocates that such issues 
be decided by an ethics committee of some form. The decision making of such a 
committee will not work in the same way as that of a government or a parliament, 
since it will not be involved in political tactics. Of course, the government or 
parliament will have to lay down guidelines for such a committee, for example, 
regarding the appointment of members and what it should take into account when 
making decisions. However, such a committee will still function more like a court of 
law (hence my choice of name for this model), making its rulings according to 
predetermined standards after careful considerations, than a political assembly. It 
seems, then, that this model could avoid many of the flaws of the political model, 
while retaining the gains of having society in control and making questionable legal 
bans unnecessary. 
However, this model still has some important undesirable features. 
First, it is by no means certain that the decision making of an ethics committee will 
not be vulnerable to political tactics. The form of the ethics committee is best suited 
for seminar-like discussions, not aimed at reaching political decisions, but rather to 
explore issues by open minded discussion as a means for deeper understanding and 
communication of ideas. When transformed into a decisional authority the committee 
will not easily be able to uphold this function, since it will be subjected to public 
scrutiny and different forms of political pressures.(9) 
Secondly, as exemplified by the case of PGD in Sweden, ethics committees are very 
open to manipulation, since they have to rely completely on outside expertise. The 
whole idea of an ethics committee is to have a small group of people representing 
different perspectives, interests and specialities, who perform their duties in the 
committee beside their regular activities. The members in such a group have very 
little chances of real critical scrutiny of the information provided by outside experts, 
and thus few opportunities to safeguarding against being manipulated by these 
experts. This problem is not very likely to arise as long as the ethics committee is 
confided to its traditional task of conducting open minded discussion. However, when 
such committees are transformed into policy making bodies, the problem will most 
probably emerge and be very hard to safeguard against. In short, the quasi-legal 
model is to weak to be an efficient guard of society's interests in controlling the move 
of medical procedures from research to clinical routine. 
The Bureaucratic Model  
The flaws of the quasi-legal model naturally leads to the suggestion that decision 
making regarding the move of medical procedures from research to routine should be 
handled by an administrative body that is strong enough to able to sufficiently resist 
politicisation and manipulation due to biased expert-opinions. These objectives can 
be achieved in the form of a bureaucratic unit with its own case-officers, capable of 
critical assessment of the information provided by experts, and a well defined "Code 
of practice" regarding what information is needed in order for a procedure to be 
considered for approval, as well as the considerations that should be taken into 
account when deciding whether or not to issue such an approval. The role model for 
this type of organisation is agencies for licensing of new drugs, such as the FDA in 
the United States or Läkemedelsverket in Sweden. In fact, one country has already 
implemented this model regarding the field of human embryology and assisted 
procreation, namely the United Kingdom, by its Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority. 
Of course, such a unit will still be politicised to some extent, since its "Code of 
practice" and the considerations relevant for its decision making will have to be laid 
down by the government or parliament. However, in its daily work, it will be free of 
direct political influence.(10)  Moreover, a well-defined "Code of practice" will 
ensure that everyone will know whether or not there is any point in asking for 
approval of a given medical procedure, and what processes are needed to be gone 
through in order to reach the point where an application for approval is meaningful. 
Of course, the final decision will still be indeterminate. However, specialists and 
potential patients are still in a much better situation regarding the chances to predict 
the outcome, and to calculate the time it may take before a decision is made. 
Furthermore, the bureaucratic model retains the gains of the previously discussed 
models. It leaves society in control of the move of medical procedures from research 
to clinical routine. It slows down the pace of this process without making it 
unacceptably slow. It removes the need for rigid and vague legislations, which can be 
exchanged for the simple ruling that new medical procedures in certain specified 
fields (for example, the fields of genetics and assisted procreation) may not be used in 
routine health care unless permission has been issued by the licensing authority. 
Concerns about certain forms of extremely risky procedures (such as germ-line gene 
therapy) may be met by writing into the statues of the agency that considerations 
regarding long-term risks should be accorded a large weight in its decision making. 
I do not claim that the bureaucratic model will not have any problems. On the 
contrary, it will most certainly be affected by many of the problems known to arise in 
bureaucratic organisations. However, in my view, this model is far superior to all the 
other models that have been suggested so far. Furthermore, the use of this model also 
has the further gain of making the introduction of new and risky health care 
procedures more coherent. For the fact is that this kind of model has already been in 
use in many countries for many years regarding the introduction of medical 
procedures involving new drugs in routine health care, and with good results at that. 
It is hard to see any good reason why other kinds of medical procedures should not be 
handled in a similar way.  
  
6. Relevant Considerations for A Licensing Authority  
I will now close this brief presentation by making some remarks on the basic ethical 
issue formulated in section 3 above. Against the background of my suggestion that 
the bureaucratic model is the best solution to the political issue of how society should 
organise and administrate the move of medical procedures from the area of research 
into routine health care, the basic ethical issue can also be formulated as the issue of 
which considerations that are relevant (and to what degree) in the decision making of 
a licensing authority for new and risky medical procedures. I will not go deeply into 
this complex issue, but merely make some pointers to three types of considerations 
that would presumably have to play an important role in this context.(11) 
Beneficence for Patients  
A first and almost self-evident consideration has to do with the degree to which a 
given medical procedure would be beneficial for potential patients. To what extent 
does the procedure cure, relieve or ease inconveniences for these patients, and how 
serious are these inconveniences? The more beneficial effects for patients that may be 
achieved through the use of the procedure, and the more likely such beneficial results 
are, the more reasons to approve of it for use in routine health care. 
Safety for Patients  
Another, equally self-evident, consideration regards the probability that the procedure 
will harm the patients rather than benefit them. How great is this probability, and how 
serious are the harms that could result? The more harmful effects for patients that 
may be effected through the use of the procedure, and the more likely such harmful 
effects are, the more reasons to reject it for use in routine health care 
Both these considerations has to do with balancing of possible benefits and risks. But, 
how should these be balanced? This is the hard part of the discussion of the basic 
ethical issue. Without putting forward any argument, I claim that this balancing 
should be made from the point of view of those very people that would be directly 
affected by the decision to use or not to use the procedure ? i.e., the potential patients 
themselves. From the point of view of the decision makers in the licensing authority, 
this seems to suggest two important restrictions:  
  
1) Medical procedures should not be offered to patients unless it may be 
rational for these patients  (in the light of their own aims and values) to 
accept this offer after having been fully and successfully informed about 
risks and possible benefits.
2) Medical procedures should not be offered to patients unless there is 
enough information available regarding benefits and risks of the 
procedure in question in order to guide a rational decision of a patient 
regarding whether or not to accept such an offer.(12)  
 
Safety for Other Affected Parties  
This consideration becomes relevant in light of the common reason for why germ-line 
gene therapy should be resisted. The argument in favour of this usually refers to the 
grave uncertainties and risks for future generations involved in irreversible and 
inheritable genetic changes of human beings. In order not to be an expression of mere 
conservatism, this consideration must, of course, also involve the aspect that not 
making such inheritable genetic changes may also severely harm future individuals, 
and that research on germ-line gene therapy may produce valuable knowledge 
regarding germ-line genetic changes not caused by such therapy (but by such things 
as exposure to radiation or toxic substances). However, how these aspects should be 
balanced is much too big an issue to be discussed in the present context.(13)  
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